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I. INTRODUCTION
Some time ago, I was approached by several esteemed members
of the faculty of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center who asked me to
consider preparing an article for publication in the Louisiana Law
Review. When they informed me that the topic of the article was to
be harmless error, as considered from the "prosecutor's perspective,"
my initial reaction was one of reticence to undertake such a daunting
task. At the time I was a prosecutor with the Louisiana Attorney
General's Office, and thus was familiar with the core issues that such
an article would have to examine. I was also generally familiar, from
my time as a judicial clerk, with the variegated treatment given this
topic nationwide by published opinions and articles. In my personal
practice, I had often heard the cynical view of the defense bar
regarding judicial application of the doctrine. And I knew first-hand
the prosecutor's feeling when briefing harmless error issues, a feeling
much akin, I think, to that which must arise during a game of Russian
roulette.
Despite my initial reservations, I undertook to attempt a concise
discussion of the issue. My goal is to present a statement that is
sufficiently academic to be worthy of consideration, yet not so prolix
or turgid as to prove elusive or impracticable. I hope I have
succeeded, and that something worthwhile, even if only further
discussion, will come from this.
Additionally, while this article is indeed written from a
"prosecutor's perspective," further elucidation of that perspective is
appropriate. During my time as a prosecutor, I, like most
prosecutors, was often stirred by the great responsibilities that were
the natural concomitant of the power inherent in my position.
Indeed, now that I am again in private practice I often miss the purity,
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if not the clarity, of having as my first and only client the people of this
state, and perhaps in a larger sense the elusive concept of"justice." I
therefore believe that an ethical prosecutor cannot simply assume a
counterpoint to the position of the defense, as would an adversary in
civil litigation, because to do so would comprise an elevation of the
prosecutor's own interests, or those of some other interested party,
above the interests ofjustice. Thus, while I believe whole-heartedly in
the dialectic process, this article is not simply an adversarial exercise
vis-ei-vis any similar presentation of the defense bar, and I trust it will
not be read in that light.
II. NARROWING THE QUESTION
In federal court, the universe of errors in a criminal case is
susceptible to division between those errors that merely violate a
statutory rule or maxim, and those errors violative of constitutional
protections. This analytical divide, while determinative of the
applicable standard of review in federal court, is essentially irrelevant
to Louisiana appellate courts. This is because, at least for the time
being, the Louisiana Supreme Court appears to have adopted a single
harmless error methodology to be applied uniformly to all manners of
error, whatever their dimension.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has also apparently adopted the
distinction, first articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in one of the
two majority opinions in Arizona v. Fulminante,2 between "structural"
and "trial" errors.' A "structural" error is one that so undermines the
fundamental principles that govern the course of American criminal
prosecutions that the error is considered per se prejudicial, and no
harmless error review is possible.4 When structural error occurs, there
has been no cognizable prosecution, conviction, or sentence in the eyes
of the law. As one might infer, the range of "structural" error is
narrow5 and exclusive; all errors not qualified as "structural" are
considered "trial" errors subject to harmless error review.
1. See State v. Johnson, 664 So. 2d 94, 100 (La. 1995); State v. Gibson, 391
So. 2d 421,427-28 (La. 1980). This statement applies only to issues arising under
Louisiana statutory or constitutional law, since federal law governs appellate review
of errors involving the denial of federal constitutional rights. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 826-27 (1967). Thus, to the extent that
this article is construed as promoting a change in the way that harmless error
analysis is performed by the appellate courts of this state, any such change is only
applicable to errors arising under Louisiana law.
2. 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
3. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125 (La. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 874, 112
S. Ct. 211 (1991).
4. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-11, 111 S.Ct. at 1264-65.
5. See Johnson, 664 So. 2d at 101(citations omitted).
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This article takes no position regarding the structural/trial error
dichotomy. First, all "structural" errors recognized to date are of a
federal constitutional dimension,6 and are therefore governed by
issues of federal law beyond the scope of this article. Second, the
criticisms of this dichotomy have been pointed and poignant, and the
courts' difficulties in effectively applying it have been the subject of
much learned comment.7 Finally, echoing a point made by several
courts, if "structural" errors are indeed so flagrant and injurious to the
integrity of our legal system, then such errors cannot and will not be
found harmless by any reasonably constructed mode of harmless
error review.
To further narrow the focus, however, it is helpful to separate at
the threshold instances of potentially reversible error into five
separate categories. These categories are defined by both the stage
of the prosecution wherein they may be expected to occur, and the
nature of the error (and analysis) they engender. These categories
include: 1) errors that occur in the course of pretrial proceedings;' 2)
errors that occur in the course of voir dire; 3) errors in the taking of
evidence or "evidentiary" error; 4) improper argument or comment
by counsel; and 5) erroneous jury instructions.9 While there are
certainly particular species of error that do not fall neatly within these
five categories, e.g., trial by a biased judge, these five categories
provide a functional framework within to consider the gamut of
reversible error.
Addressing these five categories of error, it is safe to say that our
current harmless error rule has been formulated, articulated, and
refined with the category of evidentiary error in mind. As will be
explained in greater detail in the following section, Louisiana's
generic harmless error rule focuses upon the effect of the subject
error upon a particular jury's verdict. Obviously, the first two
categories (errors occurring during pre-trial procedures and voir dire)
involve error occurring prior to the selection and empanelling of a
petit jury. As might be expected, therefore, these categories of error
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., David McCord, The "Trial "/"Structural'" Error Dichotomy:
Erroneous, andNotHarmless, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1401 (1997); Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 152 (1991).
8. "Pretrial proceedings" refers to matters such as continuance motions,
discovery, arraignment, including challenges to timeliness of the institution of
prosecution. It does not encompass evidence-related rulings that may occur prior
to the commencement of trial, such as rulings on motions to suppress evidence or
motions in limine.
9. A separate category not included herein is errors that occur post-verdict, for
example, errors at sentencing.
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have attendant and particularized modes of analysis."° The category
of errors concerning improper argument or comment can, in turn, be
seen as derivative of, or at least interrelated with, evidentiary issues;
after all, it is the evidence presented that determines the proper scope
of argument and comment." Similarly, in assessing errors falling
within the category of erroneous jury instructions, it is often the
evidentiary impact that is determinative, i.e., did the erroneous
instruction unduly focus the jury's attention on particular evidence,
or did it distract the jury from focusing upon evidence beneficial to
the defendant? 2
Thus, given the normative, if not heuristic, thrust of this article,
the focus herein will be upon evidentiary error. Accordingly, all the
exemplars presented herein fall within the category of evidentiary
error. 3  Such a focus is warranted because of its commonplace
occurrence, the fact that at least two other categories relate to
evidentiary error (and may therefore benefit from a systematization
of the way in which such error is reviewed), and the synchronicity
between such error and our current formulation of the generic
harmless error rule.
Finally, this article concerns the standard of harmless error
review to be given evidentiary errors claimed by the defendant in an
appeal from a verdict of guilty rendered by a petit jury.'4 This is
because a claim by a defendant that he was prejudiced because
evidence was erroneously admitted or excluded from his trial is, in
the author's estimation, the most frequently occurring and most
vexing species of error. If this article sheds any light upon the way
in which the harmlessness of evidentiary error is to be determined,
then its influence upon other categories of error will follow.
10. See, e.g., State v. Ignot, 701 So. 2d 1001, 1013-14 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1997),
writ denied, 745 So. 2d 618 (La. 1999) (considering errors arising from amendment
of bill of information, motion for continuance, and arraignment).
11. La. Code Crirn. P. art. 774; see State v. Casey, 775 So. 2d 1022, 1036 (La.
2000) (discussing proper scope of argument and analysis of errors therein).
12. To the extent a challenged jury instruction addresses issues not related to
the evidence actually received at trial, such as the burden of proof or the elements
of an offense, the courts have tended to evolve particularized modes of analysis for
such errors, including finding that such errors are "structural" in nature and thus not
subject to harmless error review. See, e.g., Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1125.
13. It must be recognized that this category is subject to a further division into
two subcategories, namely evidentiary error involving the admission of evidence,
and error involving the exclusion of evidence. While each of these subcategories
of error may suggest different methodologies in assessing harmlessness, these
differences are not so great as to justify variance of the governing legal principles
of harmless error review.
14. This is "obvious" given that, as a matter of statutory and constitutional law,
the State cannot appeal a verdict of acquittal. La. Code Crir. P. art. 912.
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III. THE NATURE OF HARMLESS ERROR
Before any consideration of the standards to be applied to harmless
error review can take place, the origins and history of the harmless
error doctrine, as well as the public policies animating it, must be
understood. That being said, this article will not attempt to cover again
ground that has been thoroughly plowed by other commentators.
Suffice it to say, in the early years of the Twentieth Century both the
public and jurists became highly critical of the widespread appellate
practice of overturning judgments and convictions upon the discovery
of any error, regardless of its significance.' Congress responded in
1919 by enacting the first harmless error rule, a statutory guide
applicable to cases heard in federal courts.' The state legislatures
subsequently adopted harmless error rules of their own. As the number
of rights enjoyed by criminal defendants expanded over the 1960's and
1970's, the application of the harmless error doctrine expanded as well.
Louisiana has followed the national trend. In Louisiana, harmless
error review is mandated by the legislature. The legislative history of
this provision was examined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State
v. Johnson:
The Louisiana harmless error rule was first codified in 1928
with the enactment of former LSA-R.S. 15:557.[17] This rule
limited reversals to cases where the error complained of
probably had a substantial effect upon the outcome of the trial.
Paul M. Hebert, The Problem ofReversible Error in Louisiana,
6 Tul.L.Rev. 169, 199-200 (1932); Dale E. Bennett, The 1966
Code of Criminal Procedure, 27 La.Law Rev. 175,230 (1967).
See also, La. Code Crim. P. art. 921, Official Revision
Comment (C)).
15. See, e.g., Addison K. Goff, IV, Variations of a Common Theme: An
Analysis of Louisiana 's Experience With Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 53 La.
L. Rev. 1577, 1578-82 (1993) (providing a succinct summary of the history of the
American harmless error rule).
16. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173 (1996).
17. Former La. R.S. 15:557 provided:
No judgment shall be set aside, or a new trial granted by any appellate
court of this state, in any criminal case, on the grounds of misdirection of
the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or as to error
of any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court
to which application is made, after an examination of the entire record, it
appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage
of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or
constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.
2003]
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In 1966, LSA-R.S. 15:557 was amended and reenacted as La.
Code Crim. P. art. 921 .[18] Article 921 now provides:
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate
court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights of the accused.' 9
The history of Louisiana's harmless error rule makes clear that there
has been one common directive: appellate courts should not reverse
convictions for errors unless the accused's substantial rights have
been violated.
Is, then, the application of the harmless error doctrine in
Louisiana merely the application of a statute? Hardly. First, as will
be discussed in the following section, the current harmless error rule
essentially ignores the plain text of Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 921 in favor of the judge-made rule articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California.2" This fact is not
particularly disturbing, as the manner in which an appellate court
reviews a case, as well as the particular remedies available to that
court, are questions that tend to fall within the judicial purview, and
not the legislative one.2' What it does suggest, however, is that, as in
many other areas of the law that fall within the judicial function, the
particular contours of Louisiana's harmless error doctrine are the
result of the balancing of several competing policy factors by the
courts of this state. The ultimate question presented in this process
is whether, in light of the applicable policies, a particular error in a
particular case warrants reversal of a conviction and, if appropriate,
retrial.
18. The 1966 version of LSA-Code Crim. P. art. 921 provided:
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court on any
ground unless in the opinion of the court after an examination of the entire
record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a
miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right.
19. 664 So. 2d 94, 100.
20. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967).
21. See Paul M. Hebert, The Problem ofReversible Error in Louisiana, 6 Tul.
L. Rev. 169, 169-70 (1932) ("Most courts, independent of statute, announced the
rule that to warrant a reversal the error must be prejudicial to the party complaining,
and that the commission of harmless error furnishes no ground for a new trial.")
(footnote omitted). Indeed, rigid adherence to the language of Article 921, to the
extent it is contrary to what custom and experience has taught the courts, might well
comprise a violation of the separation-of-powers between the legislative and
judicial branches. This argument, while intriguing, has not been made in any
reported Louisiana case, and given the tendency of the courts of this state to
proceed unilaterally in the application ofLouisiana's harmless error rule is probably
academic at best.
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What are those policy factors? One that frequently lurks in the
background, although rarely stated, is the significant cost of retrial.
The term "cost" covers a range of items that far exceed the simple
demands of time and money that a new trial engenders. This term
also includes certain human costs, such as the imposition that a new
trial will place upon the jurors forced to surrender valuable time to
hear a case already presented to anotherjury. Not least of the "costs"
that attend retrials is the significant impact that they have upon the
victims of crime, and the families of those victims. Succinctly put,
the American criminal justice system exhibits an unfortunate
tendency towards "victimization of the victim." While it is possible
to write this off as a necessary concomitant of our adversarial system,
this factor grows in weight when the victim of a crime, who has
already stepped forward and been subjected to the psychological
rigor of one trial, is asked to do so again. Further human costs can be
measured in the dedication and effort that prosecutors, defense
counsel, and court staff put towards their respective tasks.
Another policy that comes into play is respect for the petit jury
system. This factor must be distinguished from the question of the
courts' ability to revisit jury issues as questions of law. Rather, the
point here is that the reversal of a jury's verdict is an explicit
rejection of that jury's disposition of the case. In the absence of
evidence of extrinsic influences upon that jury, it is legally presumed
to have considered all of the evidence presented and to have followed
the law given to it by the trial court. If society is to respect the
purview of the jury and trust in the wisdom of twelve people accepted
by court and counsel to hear the case and decide the defendant's fate,
then the judiciary should tread lightly when reversing ajury's verdict.
This particular policy issue, which often appears in the guise of a
respect for the "finality" ofjudgments, strongly suggests the need for
a harmless error rule of appellate review. It is bolstered by the
negative experience of the American judiciary with the rule of
automatic reversal that pre-dated Congress's enactment of the first
harmless error rule.
A related policy point is the question of respect for the law.
When a defendant's guilt has been laid bare in a public trial followed
by the community, the deleterious effects of appellate reversal can be
significant. In addition to the distrust that such results engender in
the law-abiding public, such outcomes can only exhort the criminal
elements of the affected community to more nefarious activities.
Respect for the law is similarly eroded when the courts ratify the
conviction of a defendant whose guilt has been determined by
reliance upon slipshod or inappropriate practices. As one
commentator has put it, "[t]he law can be an aggravating thing. It
imposes duties and responsibilities, and it sometimes forces results
2003]
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that many people in society find unpalatable." 2 Our criminal justice
system exists to serve a specific function, namely to determine the
true facts and, where appropriate in light of those facts, sanction
those who transgress the penal laws of this state. Any court ruling
that is perceived to run counter to this function cannot help but
undermine public confidence in the ability of the criminal justice
system to protect the citizenry, including those citizens wrongly
accused of criminal conduct. Part of respect for the law is respect for
the integrity of the judiciary, and, more specifically, a belief that the
judiciary is ready and willing to enforce those rights that we enjoy as
citizens of this state. When the judiciary abdicates this protective
role to promote a favorable outcome in a particular case, it leads to
negative ramifications in the long run.
The issue of integrity must also be considered in light of the
courts' normative function. The issue here, of course, is the integrity
of the law enforcement officers who investigate crimes and the
prosecutors who bring the defendants to trial. This policy increases
in significance when the error claimed is one of prosecutorial
misconduct, or when the error complained of is apparent and
incontrovertible in light of reason or the applicable jurisprudence.
Conversely, this policy is a minor one, in light of the other policy
factors recited herein, when the challenged legal error is of a new or
uncertain legal vintage, and recedes even further from view when a
defendant's connivance or cooperation facilitates or abets the error.
This, of course, leads us to the primary, although not exclusive,
policy that influences the harmless error doctrine, namely the need to
respect and enforce the rights of a criminal defendant under the law.23
While this point carries great rhetorical force when stated as a general
proposition, it often loses vigor when examined at the level of the
particular. The doctrine of harmless error is one of both right and
remedy, and the existence and vindication of a particular "right"
should not be the sole focus. Rather, it is one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether reversal of a particular conviction
is warranted. In that weighing, the nature and role of a particular
22. Supra note 16, at 1169.
23. It should be noted that one of those rights is not the right to automatic
reversal on a finding of error in the trial court. While the Louisiana Constitution
does provide that a criminal defendant has the "right ofjudicial review based upon
a complete record of all the evidence upon which the judgment is based," it
provides no direction regarding the manner or scope of such review. La. Const. art.
1, § 9. See also State v. Walker, 844 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (La. 2003) (reversing
conviction due to lack of transcript); State v. Williams, 800 So. 2d 790 (La. 2001)
(Calogero, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no federal constitutional right of appeal
corresponding to our state constitutional right to judicial review"). AccordAbney
v. U.S., 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 2038, (1977).
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"right" are significant in that certain rights are so fundamental to both
legal and popular notions of "fairness" that their derogation
negatively impacts the policy factors of respect for the law and
integrity of the judiciary.
In sum, the harmless error doctrine exists because the interplay
of these policy factors dictates that a rule of automatic reversal for
every error is imprudent. While these policy considerations help
justify the need for harmless error, however, and perhaps may
influence the scope of the doctrine, they do not define any particular
mode of analysis. This is a question for the courts.
That being said, it must be emphasized that harmless error is
fundamentally a remedial doctrine. By the time the harmless error
question is reached, the existence of legal error in the trial record has
(or should have) already been established. Thus, the harmless error
question presents a quintessential question of law for the court, in the
sense that its formulation is uniquely part of the judicial function.
Just as the Supreme Court has struggled over the years with the reach
of the exclusionary rule to remedy Fourth Amendment violations, the
courts of this state must struggle with the reach of the harmless error
rule to redress errors in the trial court. That a determination of that
question may involve a review of factual findings should not be
disconcerting, given the wide range of so-called "questions of law"
that turn upon factual determinations.24
The preceding discussion hopefully sheds some light upon the
nature of the harmless error doctrine, and explains why such a
doctrine should exist as a prudential matter. To fully understand how
these general concepts translate to a particular mode of analysis, it is
necessary to understand the standard of harmless error review
actually being applied by Louisiana courts today.
IV. GOVERNING LOUISIANA LEGAL PRINCIPLES
As noted above, the ostensible basis for Louisiana's harmless
error rule is Code of Criminal Procedure Article 921, which confines
the remedy of reversal to those errors that "affect" the "substantial
rights" of the defendant. As written, this statute focuses upon
whether the "right" violated is "substantial" in nature. Under this
24. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,527 n. 1, 107 S. Ct. 828, 831
n. 1 (1987) (determination of whether questioning comprised a Miranda violation
was question of law, not of fact); State ex rel. R.T, 781 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (La.
2001) ("[T]he constitutional standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find that the state proved all of the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979)).
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analysis, any error, however passing or innocuous, that violates a
"substantial" right warrants reversal. Conversely, any error, however
egregious or prejudicial, that violates rights that cannot be
characterized as "substantial" is harmless.
In practice, however, the Louisiana courts have tended to place the
adjective "substantial" before the term "violation," rather than
"rights."25 Stated another way, the focus in Louisiana is clearly upon
the extent to which the challenged error actually affected the outcome
of the trial. This comports with the traditional Louisiana view that
"appeals in criminal cases are not granted merely to test the correctness
of the trial court's ruling, but only to rectify injuries caused thereby."26
It also reflects the spirit of the United States Supreme Court's
admonition that a criminal "defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not
a perfect one."'27
The standard of harmless error review followed by the courts of
this State is the familiar Chapman standard, i.e., "whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction," and that "the court must be able to
declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."2 Although initially accepted by the Louisiana Supreme Court
as only a "supplemental guide in cases involving only errors of state
procedure or state law,"29 subsequent case law indicates the wholesale
acceptance of the Chapman standard as the controlling harmless error
standard for errors arising under state law.30 Unlike federal courts,3
Louisiana courts apply the Chapman standard to all such errors,
regardless of whether they are of constitutional or statutory dimension.
Louisiana's high court has provided several theoretical principles
to govern the application of the harmless error standard. For
25. This continues the plain meaning of the prior incarnations of the harmless
error rule, which asked, inter alia, whether the error "constitutes a substantial
violation of a constitutional or statutory right." Johnson, 664 So. 2d at 100
(discussing legislative history of La. Code Crir. P. art. 921).
26. State v. Saia, 33 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. 1947) (citation omitted).
27. Lutwack v. U.S., 344 U.S. 604, 619, 73 S. Ct. 481, 490 (1953).
28. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 428.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Johnson, 664 So. 2d at 96; Cage, 583 So. 2d at 1125; State v.
Willie, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1332 (La. 1990).
31. Federal courts apply the less stringent standard of Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946), to cases involving only non-
constitutional error. This standard calls for reversal only when the error can be said
to have had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S. Ct. at 1253. In addition to setting forth
the standard for harmless error review of non-constitutional error on direct appeal,
the Kotteakos standard has also been adopted as the applicable harmless error test
for federal habeas courts in collateral review of state convictions. See Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
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example, the focus of the Chapman standard is "on the impact of the
error rather than the untainted evidence. 3 2 "The proper analysis for
determining harmless error 'is not whether, in a trial that occurred
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error."' 33 This distinction, as posited, is one of
perspective and assumes that the question of what impact the error had
upon the jury can be severed from the question of whether the jury
would have convicted in the absence of error.
A view implicit in a number of the appellate decisions cited herein
is that this distinction between the impact of the error and the legal
sufficiency of the remaining evidence is a meaningless one. This
position is not, the defense bar's objections notwithstanding, an
indefensible one. If an appellate court is certain, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a guilty verdict would have been rendered in the absence
of the error, how, then, can that error still be said to have
"contributed" to the guilty verdict actually rendered? While the
philosopher's distinction between the glass half empty and the glass
half full may comprise subtle commentary about the cognitive role of
perspective, it does not alter a shared perception of what the glass
contains. Similarly, regardless of whether it is approached from the
perspective of the error, or the perspective of the "untainted"
evidence, the key question in harmless error review is whether, in
light of the entire record, the jury relied to some measure upon
improper evidence in reaching its verdict.
While many commentators have criticized the foregoing principle,
it is not necessarily inconsistent with the plain language of one aspect
of the Chapman standard. The key lies in the operative definitions of
the terms utilized in the Chapman formulation. What does it mean,
for example, to ask if an error "contributed" to the verdict? The plain
definition of the word "contribute" is "to have a share in any act or
effect,, 34 or "to give a part.",3 Thus, to contribute to a guilty verdict,
improperly received evidence must have played a part in the rendition
of that verdict. A guilty verdict represents a finding by a competent
jury that the quantum of evidence presented in toto demonstrates the
factual guilt of the defendant beyond any reasonable doubt. Similarly,
if there is no doubt at the appellate level that the quantum of evidence
correctly introduced would have led to the same result, it should then
follow that the erroneously admitted evidence had no "share" in the
evidence upon which the conviction rests.
32. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 427.
33. State v. Quatrevingt, 670 So. 2d 197, 206 (La. 1996) (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993)).
34. Blacks Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968).
35. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1971).
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To restate this concept in terms more familiar to practitioners and
judges, the term "contribute" indicates a causal nexus, however
tenuous, between the error and the verdict. If there is no reasonable
doubt that a guilty verdict would be rendered in the absence of error,
then that same error could not have had a hand in "causing" that same
verdict to be rendered. In this circumstance, nothing is gained by
distinguishing between two sides of the same coin.
While this mode of analysis is reasonable, cognizance must be
taken of the defense bar's objection that such an analysis does not
fully comport with the admonition that the "focus" of harmless error
review rest upon the error complained of, and not the other evidence
of record. Upon a review of the relevant case law, this objection
appears well founded. A simple review of the record without
reference to the erroneously admitted evidence is of necessity
incomplete because it does not address the full range of information
that was available to the jury. Indeed, in any practical circumstance
it seems that without considering both the properly admitted and
improperly admitted evidence, no meaningful review of the jury's
verdict is possible, as any such review must delve into the effect of
such evidence upon the jury.
The problem with any analysis that focuses solely upon the error,
however, is that the Chapman standard implicitly assumes a
quantitative, and not a qualitative, standard for harmless error review.
The focus of the Chapman standard is upon the error's contribution
to the verdict, not upon any quality appurtenant to the error. Turning
the appellate lens upon the actual verdict returned necessitates a
quantitative consideration of the impact of all evidence received in
relation to the evidence erroneously admitted. Thus, if the error
complained of is minor or insignificant in relation to the competent
evidence admitted, the error is harmless. Conversely, if the
competent evidence admitted is so overwhelming in relation to the
evidence improperly admitted as to make the latter minor or
insignificant, the error is harmless. While Louisiana's State Capitol
building may be a breathtaking site upon the alluvial flatlands of the
Mississippi, it fades to a meaningless speck against the backdrop of
Mount Everest. Similarly, the impact of any evidentiary error can
only be assessed against the backdrop of the other evidence of record.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized this practical reality
on several occasions. In State v. Johnson,36 for example, the Court
stated that "[a]n error did not 'contribute' to the verdict when the
erroneous trial feature is unimportant in relation to everything else
the jury considered on the issue."" Similarly, in the 1998 case of
36. 664 So. 2d 94.
37. Id. at 100 (citation omitted).
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State v. Tyler,38 the Court found an evidentiary error involving the
improper admission of "other crimes" evidence harmless, and opined
that "one [could] reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury 'actually rested the verdict' on the evidence properly
introduced by the prosecutor, rather than on the improper references to
'other crimes." 39 Moreover, on several occasions the Court has stated
that factors to be considered in determining whether a particular error
wan-ants reversal "include the importance of the evidence to the State's
case, the presence or absence of additional corroboration of the
evidence, and the overall strength of the State's case."'
It is clear from these cases that review of the entire record before
the jury is determinative of an error's harmlessness vel non. As the
Louisiana Supreme Court has put it, echoing the point made in the
preceding paragraphs, evidentiary error "may be quantitatively
assessed in the context of the other evidence to determine whether its
admission at trial is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'41 This
sentiment is buttressed by the admonition of Justice Scalia in Sullivan
v. Louisiana42 (endorsed by the Louisiana Supreme Court43) that
"[h]armless-error review looks ... to the basis on which 'the jury
actually rested its verdict."'"
As already noted, the view that the appellate court should sit as a
surrogate jury, redact the erroneous evidence from the trial record, and
then gauge what remains to determine guilt, is, under Chapman, an
incomplete approach (although such a review is an essential step in the
process). The essence of harmless error review is a weighing process,
namely the weighing of the evidence properly admitted against that
evidence erroneously admitted to determine the "impact" of the latter.
It is this step, not a simple Jackson sufficiency review of the properly
admitted evidence, that is the proper mode of analysis to determine
harmless error.
A functionally necessary concomitant of this principle is that
Louisiana appellate courts, when reviewing criminal convictions, sit as
arbiters of law, not of fact. As Justice Dennis put it in State v. Gibson:
[a]lthough the [Chapman] standard requires a reviewing court
to consider the evidence in order to determine if there is a
reasonable possibility that the error had prejudicial effect, it
38. 723 So. 2d 929 (La. 1998).
39. Id. at 948 (citations omitted).
40. State v. Harris, 711 So. 2d 266, 269 (La. 1998) (citing Willie, 559 So. 2d
at 1332).
41. State v. Johnson, 664 So. 2d at 100-01.
42. 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
43. Johnson, 664 So. 2d at 100.
44. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500
U.S. 391,404, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991)).
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does not permit a court to substitute for the verdict its
judgment of what the jury would or should have decided in the
absence of error.45
Nor does this mean that a reviewing court should attempt to glean the
scope of the actual jury's deliberations, for, as any trial judge,
prosecutor, or defense attorney can clearly attest, "in the end no judge
can know for certain what factors led to the jury's verdict. ' 46
Nonetheless, Justice Dennis also recognized in Gibson that
"[w]hether there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained
of might have contributed to the conviction is no more a question of
fact than other rules applied by us routinely that call for careful
consideration of the evidence."4 Additionally, every appellate court
has had experience with "weighing" the evidence, as a question of
law, to determine evidentiary sufficiency underJackson v. Virginia,48
or in the review of summaryjudgments and similar matters involving
application of a legal standard to a factual record. Appellate
harmless error review is proper as long as the jury's province of
"crediting or discrediting evidence" is not invaded, i.e., as long as the
appellate court reviews the record under a legal standard. Thus, any
appellate court reviewing the record of a criminal conviction must
view the record from the point of view of a "reasonable"juror.49 This
standard, one with which appellate courts are intimately familiar,
eliminates any question of impermissible inquiry into the actual
jury's deliberations.
Moreover, "[o]nce a defendant has been found guilty of the crime
charged, the fact finder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved
through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the
evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. 50 Given the existence of a jury verdict of guilty as a
45. 391 So. 2d at 427.
46. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at284, 113 S. Ct. at 2084) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Nor does our law of evidence allow any inquiry into the factors that actually went
into the makeup of a particular jury verdict. La. Code Evid. art. 606(B) (1995).
47. 391 So. 2d at 427(footnote omitted).
48. 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
49. At first glance there may appear to be an inherent tension here between the
reviewing court's inquiry into questions of law, and the admonition of Sullivan that
the inquiry be upon the actual basis of the jury's verdict. Any such tension is
illusory. Justice Scalia's point in Sullivan was that the court must consider the
evidence actually presented from the perspective of the actual jury. No court or
commentator has ever suggested that the appellate court should utilize its own
discretion and judgment in passing upon such evidence. Rather, the clear appellate
standard is that of a reasonable juror sitting in the shoes of the jurors who actually
decided the case. If such review is not possible, then the standard for appellate
review of sufficiency of the evidence in Jackson is unworkable.
50. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
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precursor to any harmless error review, this legal conclusion is
apposite. Again, the pertinent question is not whether "any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt,"'" but rather whether such a rational trier
of fact would consider the error unimportant in relation to the other
evidence presented. Stated another way, if a reasonable juror, after
considering the error, would find no cause to question his verdict,
then the verdict "actually rested upon" the other evidence of record,
and the error cannot be said to have "contributed" to the verdict.5 2 If
an appellate court can make such a finding, then there is no
reasonable53 possibility the error contributed to the verdict.
Finally, there is no simple formula or magic incantation that can
guide the appellate court's ultimate determination of harmlessness vel
non. The key ingredient to resolving this issue is an experienced and
knowledgeable jurist who must make a determination one way or the
other. Nearly every day the appellate courts of this state review
summary judgments and convictions to determine whether the
evidence presented is "sufficient" to justify the result. These same
courts, applying the same standards, may utilize the same technique
of legal review of a factual record to determine whether the impact
of an evidentiary error, when compared against the evidence of
record, is so significant as to be "harmful," or so minor as to be
"harmless." No additional exercise in legal legerdemain is required.
V. THE "PROBATIVE IMPACT" OF THE ERROR
One additional point should be addressed to complete the picture.
It must be recognized that, in determining the "impact" of the error,
the isolation of erroneously admitted evidence alone potentially does
not address the full prejudice that may accrue from evidentiary error.
Rather, a reviewing court, to fully perform the appellate function
from the perspective of a "reasonable" juror, must be able to consider
both the "content" and the "probative effect" of such evidence.54
As a matter of common sense, erroneously admitted evidence,
almost by definition, is prejudicial due to its content. "Other crimes"
evidence, for example, is prejudicial because when a jury hears about
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See Harris, 723 So. 2d at 948.
53. This adjective is an important one, as it reinforces the notion that appellate
review must proceed under a legal standard that assumes the deliberative processes
of a rational juror. Actual juries often seize upon evidence of little legal
significance, and thereby draw inferences that are not "rational" in a legal sense, in
reaching their verdicts. Such deliberative jaunts are not available to appellate
courts. See supra note 46.
54. See Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 70 (1970).
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other crimes, acts, or wrongs the defendant may have committed, it
tends to believe that the defendant is more likely to be guilty of the
additional criminal acts with which he is charged because he is a
"bad" man. Erroneously admitted evidence can also have a
significant "probative effect," in the sense that it may corrupt or
undermine other properly admitted evidence, or may otherwise alter
the dynamics of the trial. Since the duty of the appellate court is to
assess the "contribution" of the error to the verdict, that appellate
court must be able to effectively assess the "probative effect" of
erroneously admitted evidence. If not, then the scope of the error has
not been fully quantified, and the error cannot be properly evaluated
in relation to the properly admitted evidence of record.
A perfect example of a case where the distinction between an
error's "content" and "probative effect" may have been telling is
State v. Johnson." In Johnson, the defendant, charged with
attempted second-degree murder and aggravated burglary, testified
that he was at another location when the crime occurred. 6 The State,
in an attempt to impeach the defendant's credibility, introduced
documentary evidence of five prior felony burglary convictions,
whose existence the defendant denied. 7 It was subsequently
discovered, although the jury never heard it, that the defendant had
been correct and that the five counts of felony burglary had been
nolle prosequied by the State. 8 The majority of the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that the admission of this evidence had been
erroneous, but also held that its admission was harmless given the
substantial other evidence indicating defendant's guilt.5 9
Justice Victory, writing in dissent, pointed out that the majority's
decision failed to consider the "probative effect" of the error, which
extended beyond the mere content of that evidence to the heart of the
defendant's alibi defense:
The state's complete destruction of [the defendant's]
credibility, and thus his alibi defense, through the use of
certified court documents showing five felony burglary
convictions that did not exist, in my view prevented the
defendant from having a fair trial. By the time the case was
submitted for decision, the jury had been erroneously led to
believe that the defendant, who was on trial for attempted
second degree murder and aggravated burglary, had been
previously convicted of five burglaries, had lied about the
55. 664 So. 2d 94.
56. Id. at 97.
57. Id. at 97-98.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 102.
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convictions under oath, and had been caught lying about them
in the jury's presence. In fact, the defendant was telling the
truth about these nonexistent convictions, but the jury never
knew it. Any chance that the jury had of properly weighing
the defendant's credibility, and thus his alibi, was destroyed
by the prejudice created by the inadmissible evidence.6 °
As Justice Victory realized, the "impact" of the error upon the jury
stretched far beyond the mere submission that the defendant was a
bad man because he had prior burglary convictions (although this
itself is by no means a negligible impact). It also included a direct
and forceful attack upon the defendant's theory of innocence, and
further made the defendant appear a liar by directly contradicting his
trial testimony.
In reaching its decision, the majority failed to examine the impact
of the improperly admitted "other crimes" evidence in relation to the
evidence properly admitted; in fact, it failed to consider the error at
all in performing its harmless error analysis. If, as asserted herein,
the proper question is the proportional relationship of the error to the
competent evidence, the Johnson majority failed to perform the
comprehensive analysis called for by the harmless error doctrine.
The "probative effect" of the error extends beyond the evidence
erroneously admitted to other evidence and the inferences that may
be taken therefrom. Accordingly, the scope of the error should
encompass related evidence and inferences fairly traceable to the
error. The "legal conclusion" that the evidence should be viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury cannot obtain for such "tainted"
evidence, and all inferences reasonably drawn from such evidence
cannot be treated as favorable to the prosecution.
While such an approach may not change the outcome in cases
like Johnson, fully defining the evidence and inferences which the
State cannot claim as its own will reduce the amount of evidence and
inferences upon which the "reasonable" juror could base a finding of
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, the impact of a
particular error may be ameliorated or even nullified by other
evidence bearing upon the fact or facts at issue. Thus, while the
admission of a confession to the police might be held erroneous, the
presence of other statements containing the same incriminating facts
and made in other, admissible (and possibly more reliable)
circumstances may nullify the probative impact of such error. As
always, a resolution of such issues involves the appellate court's
determination, sitting as reasonable jurors, of the impact of the
alleged error in relation to the other competent evidence of record.
60. Id. at 102-03 (Victory, J., dissenting).
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In sum, the standard actually applied by Louisiana appellate
courts is the Chapman standard of harmless error, which calls for
reversal if there is any reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the verdict. In practice, the question of whether an
error contributed to the verdict is determined by examining that
evidence unaffected by the error and weighing that evidence against
the illegitimate evidence to determine the impact of the error. If the
court concludes that the error, in relation to the properly admitted
evidence, is such that it would not cause a reasonable juror to
question the verdict rendered, then the erroneously admitted evidence
did not comprise a "part" or "share" of the verdict, and thus the error
did not "contribute" to the verdict. It is important, however, that an
assessment of the scope of the error include both the "content" of the
erroneously admitted evidence and the "probative effect" of that
error.
VI. EXORCISING THE GHOSTS FROM THE MACHINE
Regardless of the legal principles under which harmless error
review occurs, it is irreducibly part of the appellate function. As
such, it is subject to the vagaries and regimen of Louisiana appellate
practice. The purpose of this section is to suggest substantive and
procedural refinements that will promote clarity and consistency in
the harmless error jurisprudence of this state, while serving the
policies described previously in this article.
At the outset it must be recognized that the issue of harmless
error is reached in many cases where it need not be. This is due to
the unfortunate growth of what can be termed the "even if' and
"regardless" approaches to harmless error. In the first, the appellate
court reaches a claim of error and concludes that no legal error has
occurred, but then continues that "even if' error had occured, it
would have been harmless. The "regardless" approach goes one step
further, bypassing entirely the question of whether error has occurred,
to a finding that any prejudice the defendant may have suffered was
harmless "regardless" of whether there was any error.
There are several reasons for the development of these
approaches. One is no doubt efficiency and convenience. As our
appellate courts grapple with an ever-increasing caseload, it must be
attractive in terms of both time and effort to simply recognize a
harmless error as such without jumping through all of the hoops.
Another is the marked judicial reticence to reach matters unnecessary
to the judgment. This logic, slightly perverted, might suggest that
prudence dictates that a review for harmlessness of a claimed error,
which will tend to be case-specific, is preferable to a precedential
pronouncement on the scope of a particular right, i.e., the source of
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the "error." A further development that may abet the "even if' and
"regardless" approaches is the development and refinement of tests
for determining error, in relation to particular rights, that actually
include a finding of prejudice as a factor in determining the existence
of error.6
While these reasons may dictate similar approaches in other
contexts, they ignore the fact that review for harmlessness is only
appropriate if error has occurred. It is important that the courts first
reach the question of error, for a number of reasons. First,
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel need to be informed about
the propriety of their conduct. If a reviewing court bypasses or pays
only lip service to the question of whether particular conduct is
proper, it is not serving its normative function. This is particularly
true in the case of the "regardless" approach, which gives no clue at
all whether the challenged conduct is proper. 6
Furthermore, because such use of the harmless error doctrine
tends to be a matter of convenience, the manner in which it is applied
tends to be slipshod and erratic. Such a use of the harmless error
doctrine merely detracts further from its already tarnished reputation.
If a harmless error analysis is to be undertaken, it should be fully
61. For example, to prove a violation of the due process right to discovery of
favorable evidence, the defendant must show that the evidence was "material either
to guilt or to punishment." Edwards, supra note 16, at 1177. Evidence is material
under this standard "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result would have been different." Id. Thus, a
defendant seeking to vindicate a constitutional right to discovery of exculpatory
evidence generally must show that a challenged action was reasonably likely to
have affected the actual verdict. A similar showing is necessary to establish a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. A
defendant asserting such a violation must establish not only that his or her counsel's
work "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," but also that the
shortcomings in counsel's work prejudiced the defense, meaning "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Id.
62. Judge Edwards has noted a similar trend in the federal courts:
Another troubling aspect of this trend is judicial use of the harmless-error
rule to avoid reaching a difficult issue in a case. Courts sometimes openly
decline to decide whether a defendant's rights have been violated, instead
evading the issue by stating that any error that might have occurred was
harmless. This practice leaves unresolved the question of whether an error
even occurred, thus offering no guidance to trial courts. What may be an
important question of trial error is therefore sidestepped by the application
of a doctrine that itself presupposes the existence of such an error.
Nothing suggests that the harmless-error rule was meant to serve such a
purpose. The flip side of this practice is the needless use of harmless
error, which occurs when, upon rejecting the merits of some claim of error
in an action of the trial judge, the appellate court goes on to say that even
if error had occurred, it would have been harmless.
Edwards, supra note 16, at 1182-83 (citations omitted).
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articulated and involve a comprehensive and thoughtful examination
of the entire record. Such an approach is not conducive to use as a
"quick fix" when treating difficult or convoluted issues of legal error.
For these and the foregoing reasons, it is suggested that appellate
courts adhere to a consistent, two-step methodology in treating legal
error susceptible to a harmless error review: 1) determine fully the
existence vel non of legal error (and its scope); and 2) review that
error in relation to the record evidence to determine its harmlessness.
Additional consideration must also be given to the manner in
which cases involving harmless error review are briefed by counsel.
As any practitioner knows, appellate courts often look to the briefs of
the parties to define the issues before them, and also rely in large part
upon the parties' explanation of the record to guide appellate review
of that record. Given this, it is unfair to expect appellate courts to
engage in a cogent and probing examination of harmless error issues
if the defense does nothing more than posit a conclusion that the error
is not harmless. The typical response of any prosecutor, when
confronted with a conclusory allegation of harm, is to provide the
appellate court with a laundry list of record evidence extrinsic to the
error that supports the conviction. The result is what we tend to see,
namely an opinion concluding that any error is harmless and
providing as its basis a restatement of the listing of evidence provided
in the State's brief.
The presentation of proper argument is facilitated by the
placement of burdens of production and/or persuasion upon the
parties. In Louisiana, the current rule is that "the burden is on
someone other than the person pre udiced by [the challenged error]
to show that it was harmless. ' °  The terminology is perhaps
misplaced in the appellate context, since "burdens," "presumptions,"
and other such artifices are usually imposed in light of evidentiary
concerns. Be that as it may, the basic principle of forcing the parties
to articulate their positions fully, in light of the evidence and
controlling or persuasive authority, is a wise one.
This article has already discussed the issues of "content" and
"probative effect" that attend an error. Often, however, appellate
63. Gibson, 391 So. 2d at 426. This language in Gibson cites as its authority
the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman, which noted that "the original common-
law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove
that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of the erroneously obtained
judgment." 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828 (citing I Wigmore, Evidence § 21 (3d
ed. 1940)). The question of whether an antiquated citation from Wigrnore is a
sufficient basis for the imposition of this "burden" on the State is a close one. It
could be argued that the burden should properly be imposed upon the defendant as
the party seeking reversal of the judgment of the trial court. Nonetheless, the
proposed refinement of appellate procedure does not remove the ultimate burden
of persuasion regarding harmlessness from the State.
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courts fail to embrace the full impact of the error, in clear derogation
of the Chapman standard, in favor of a recitation of the evidence that
supports the verdict. Practice and experience dictates that this result
is often due to the failure of the defendant to sufficiently brief the
"probative effect" of the claimed error. As a finding of error imposes
no "presumptions" regarding the quality of the remaining evidence
of record, the response of the appellate courts is entirely appropriate
in light of such briefing.
Accordingly, in the interests of promoting more comprehensive
appellate review of harmless error questions, the courts should
consider imposing some threshold burden upon a defendant seeking
reversal of a conviction for evidentiary error. Such a burden would
require the defendant to make some showing, analogous perhaps to
a "burden of production" or prima facie case in the trial court,
regarding the full scope of the claimed error, i.e., an explanation of
both the "content" and "probative effect" of the claimed error. While
the ultimate "burden" of demonstrating harmlessness would remain
with the State, this approach would obviate frivolous claims; after all,
if a defendant cannot articulate how he has been harmed, then a court
does not know why the conviction should be reversed. Furthermore,
this threshold showing would require the State to specifically address
the claimed error, providing the appellate court with a detailed and
informed discussion on the actual effect of the error on the verdict
rendered. This, in turn, will provide for a higher level of judicial
scrutiny and produce better-reasoned opinions, significantly
advancing the harmless error jurisprudence of this State.
Finally, in addition to the "procedural" changes noted above, one
substantive matter should be considered by the courts of this state,
namely the continued application of the Chapman harmless error
standard to all errors, constitutional and statutory. As already noted,
the federal courts apply the less stringent Kotteakos to errors arising
from misapplication of federal statutory law and in all habeas corpus
proceedings.' This standard, which calls for reversal only when an
error has a "substantial and injurious effect upon the jury's verdict,"
is one that more directly comports with the actual language of
Louisiana's harmless error statute, which also looks to the
"substantial" nature of the harm. Additionally, this standard is one
that is well-developed and fully explicated in the federal
jurisprudence. Application of the policies underlying the harmless
error doctrine suggests that applying the same standard to the
erroneous admission of a document as would apply to a violation of
the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
not a well-considered, balanced, or prudent approach.
64. See supra note 31.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A criminal appeal does not excite joy in anyone involved. The
typical prosecutor, having spent long hours and great effort to secure
a conviction, now faces a potential exercise in minutiae in a forum
which knows nothing of the travails that have preceded the appeal.
The defendant and his counsel recognize the burdens they face in
attempting to reverse a duly rendered jury verdict. The court faces
long hours of record review and legal research in seeing that justice,
as defined by the laws of this state, is done.
It is the author's fervent hope that this article will be of assistance
to prosecutor, defense counsel, and court alike. Ethical prosecutors
and defense lawyers, when faced with the harmless error question,
want above all to know where they stand and how to present their
respective arguments in a manner that will be well-received by the
reviewing court. I also believe that appellate courts desire a similar
clarity and uniformity of practice, particularly given the often
complex and nuanced nature of the records they are asked to review.
If this article helps any of these in the difficult tasks they face, the
author will be satisfied.
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